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T~E

SUPRE\!E COURT OF THE SLUE OF UL\H

"':ILLIA'·I G. \' ..'\\DEVER & co:JPA\Y

Plaintiff-Appellant,

JERRY B. BLACK, DDS; 0. BRE\T
BUCK, DDS; RA'.\DY R. BL\CK, DDS;
and ROBERT H. ~. KILLPACK, DDS,
Case ;..;o, 17603
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLAXT'S BRIEF

STATD!E;..;T OF THE :\..'\TURE OF C..'\SE
This is a contract action wherein the plaintiff and
appellant sought to recover its fee for services rendered
pursuant to a written contract.

The defendants and res-

pendents brought a Counterclaim against the plaintiff for
recovery of a good faith deposit paid pursuant to the contract.
DISPOSITIO~

I~

THE LOWER COURT

This case was tried without a jury to the Honorable
Peter F. Leary, District Judge of the Third Judicial District,
on the Complaint of the plaintiff and the Answer and Counterclaim of the defendants.

The court heard testimony of the

parties and various other witnesses and received a Memorandum
filed by the plaintiff.

The court entered a Judgment of no

cause of action in favor of the defendants on plaintiff's
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Complaint.

Further, the court entered a Judgment in favor

of the defendants on the defendants' Counterclaim.

The

plaintiff filed a Notion for New Trial and a Notion to Amend
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and
filed a Memorandum in Support Thereof.

Following oral

argument, the court denied the plaintiff's Motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks to have the Judgment reversed as
to the dismissal of the plaintiff's Complaint and the award
of damages, interest and costs on the defendants' Counterclaim.

In the event the plaintiff is not found entitled to

a reversal of the dismissal of the plaintiff's Complaint,
the plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Judgment in favor of
the defendants on the Counterclaim.

In the alternative, the

plaintiff seeks a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, William G. Vandever

& Company,

is a

corporation engaged in the business of locating and negotiating commercial financing.

The defendants are four dentists

who entered into an arrangement to develop a medical office
complex in Salt Lake City. (Tr 13)
The plaintiff and the defendants are the parties to a
written agreement known as an "Authorization to Obtain
Financing."

(Exhibit 3P, Tr 18)

Pursuant to this Authorization
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to Obtain Financing, the plaintiff was emoloyed to make applications on behalf of the defendants for financing a doctors'
office complex.

(Paragraph 1 of Exhibit 3P)

As consideration

for the plaintiff's services in negotiating the financing, the
plaintiff was to receive 4 percent of the total amount of any
loan commitment payable at the time of issuance of the commitment.

(Paragraph 7 of Exhibit 3P)

The Authorization, as

pertinent to this appeal, was for financing " ... for such other
amounts and/or terms as may be acceptable to the parties."
(Paragraph 2 of Exhibit 3P)
The defendants, prior to employing the plaintiff, had
attempted unsuccessfully to obtain financing on their own.
(Tr 14)

At the initial meeting between the plaintiff and the

defendant's spokesman, Dr. Jerry Black, the plaintiff delivered
a checklist of items required for the preparation of a loan
package.

Among other things, this checklist required that an

appraisal or feasibility study be provided by the defendants.
This checklist also noted the possibility that a loan commitment
would be issued subject to an appraisal if the appraisal was not
provided.

(Paragraph 17 of Exhibit 2P)
A tentative commitment from American United Life

Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as the "Insurance
Company") for $375,000 in financing at

10~%

interest of a 20-year

term and a 25-year amortization was obtained by the plaintiff on
behalf of the defendants.

(Tr 20 and Exhibits SP and 6P)
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The defendants accepted the tentative commitment.
(Tr 21 and Exhibit 7P)

The defendants also sent deposits to

the Insurance Company as part of the good faith deposit.
and Exhibit SP)

(Tr 21

The letter of acceptance requested urgent

attention to the financing sought by the defendants. (Exhibit 7P)
The Insurance Company issued a loan commitment dated
January 16, 1979, to the defendants.

(Tr 22 and Exhibit 9P)

This commitment was a standard real estate loan commitment and
included the terms which had been accepted by the defendants.
As had been set forth in the checklist of information, the
loan amount was limited to "an amount not exceeding 75% of the
appraised value of the property as reflected by the appraisal
herein required."

(Exhibit 9P)

Following receipt of the loan commitment, appraisers
were contacted by the defendants with regard to completing the
appraisal.

The credentials of Mr. Raymond Fletcher, the

appraiser selected by the defendants, were submitted to and
approved by the Insurance Company.

(Tr 25 and Exhibit llP)

Nothing had prevented the defendants from obtaining the appraisal
prior to receipt of the commitment.

(Tr 54 and 55)

One of the defendants, Robert H. M. Killpack, was not
in the country. (Tr 60)
Killpack.

(Tr 60)

Mr. Boyd Jensen acted on behalf of Dr.

Mr. Jensen signed, on behalf of Dr. Killpack,

the Authorization to Obtain Financing and the commitment from
Insurance Company. (Tr 62 and Exhibit 9P)
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Jensen signed the Authorization knowing the maximum
amount requested was $397,000.

(Tr 66)

The commitment was

apparently signed contingent on Dr. Killpack's agreement with
the transaction.

Killpack had informed Jensen that 100% finan-

cing of the project was required.

(Tr 66)

When Jensen contacted

Killpack, he informed Killpack that there was no guarantee that
the financing was to be 100%.

Upon Jensen's representations

that 100% financing was not guaranteed, the proposal was
rejected.

(Tr 66)
Upon receipt of the commitment of the Insurance Company,

the plaintiff took steps with regard to obtaining construction
financing for the defendants.

(Tr 81-32)

The efforts regarding

construction financing were stopped when Mr. H. P. Merritt,
the Regional Vice-President for the plaintiff, was informed
by Dr. Black that the defendants would not go through with the
loan commitment.

(Tr 82)

On February 22, 1979, the Authorization to Obtain
Financing was cancelled effective 10 days thereafter.
and Exhibit 12P)

(Tr22-23

The defendants paid only $3,000 of the total

$15,000 fee.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PLAINTIFF FULLY PERFORMED ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.
THE PLAINTIFF IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS FEE
FOR ITS SERVICES.
The "Authorization to Obtain Financing" obligated the
plaintiff to make applications for financing on behalf of the

- 5-
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defendant.

(Paragraph 1 of Exhibit 3P)

As nertinent to this

action, the defendants authori:ed the nlaintiff to make apnlication
for financing "

.for such other amounts and/or terms as mav
(Paragraph 2 of Exhibit 3P)

be acceptable to the narties."

The plaintiff was to be compensated for its services in negotiating
the financing.

The comnensation was due at the time the loan

commitment was issued to the defendants. (Paragraph 7 of Exhibit
3P)
The plaintiff fully nerformed its contractual commitment by delivering the tentative bid of the Insurance Company
which was accepted by the defendants and for which the defendants
paid a 1% good faith deposit and by subsequentlv delivering
the final commitment of the Insurance Company and bv remaining
willing to· conduct further negotiations for the defendants.
The defendants by not reaching agreement among themselves or bv
subjectively disagreeing with the commitment cannot avoid their
contractual obligations.

These "defenses" are discussed through-

out the remainder of this Brief.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT AVOID THEIR OBLIGATION TO THE
PLAINTIFF BECAUSE THEY DID NOT UTILIZE THE FINANCING
OF THE INSURANCE COMPA>JY.
The law does not require that a binding contract actuallv
be entered into as a condition to recovery of a fee for services.
It is immaterial whether the defendants actually entered into
an agreement with the Insurance Comnany.
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Curtis v. 11ortensen, 1 Utah2d 35.\, 267 P2d 237 (1954),
the plaintiff brokers had a listing agreement with the defendant
entitling the plaintiffs to a commission unon oroviding a "ready,
willing and able buyer."

An "earnest money agreement" was

entered into by the defendant-seller and orosoective buyers.
The "earnest money agreement" was subject to the apnroval of the
buyers and contained other conditions.

Unon learning that the

"earnest money agreement" was conditional and pursuant to advice
of counsel, the defendant-seller rescinded the agreement.
buyers brought an action for specific performance.

The

The court

denied specific performance because there had been no consideration paid and because the defendant-seller rescinded the agreement
before it was approved by the buyers.

This court held that it

was immaterial whether the purchasers could enforce the "earnest
money agreement.''

The auestion was whether the brokers had

performed their contractual obligations by finding "ready,
willing and able buyers."

The court stated:

.under such circumstances aonellants have
fulfilled their part of the listing agreement by
having produced purchasers that were ready, willing
and able to buy the listed nronertv and are
entitled to their commissions. Such were the terms
of the listing agreement made by the parties.
There is no requirement that a binding contract
be entered into and for us to add that requirement
would be to make a new contract for them. This
we mav not do. As stated in AmJur, Sec. 184,
o. 1097:
'Once the broker has nrocured a person
~ho is able, ready and willing to Purchase on the
terms offered by the owner, he is entitled to
commissions, even though the failure to complete
the contract is due to the default or refusal of
the employer.'
267 P2d at 239.
In Curtis, this court cited with aporoval Little and
Little Sponsored
v. Fleishman
asLibrary.
follows:
by the S.J. Quinney Law
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated -OCR,
7 - may contain errors.

The substantial features of the agreement between
plaintiffs and the defendant are that the plaintiffs
were employed to effect, not consumate, a sale, and
were entitled to a commission in the event of a sale
at any price agreed upon. When the plaintiff obtained
and procured a purchaser who was able, ready and
willing to purchase for the price, and on the terms
proposed, they did all that was required fo them,
and the owner could not, under the terms of his
contract with them, arbitrarily refuse to sell and
decline to enter into negotiations of the sale with
the proposed purchaser without becoming liable to
plaintiffs for their commission.
In the present case, the plaintiff was to be comPensated for its
services in negotiating financing for the defendants.

The Plaintiff''

fee was earned upon the issuance of financing or a loan commitment
by the lending institution in accordance with the terms of Paragraph 2 of the Authorization to Obtain Financing.

This Paragranh

required that the terms be acceptable to the Parties.
None of the terms of the Authorization to Obtain Financing
required that the defendants enter into a binding agreement with
any lender.

The plaintiff fulfilled its obligations by delivering

the loan commitment.

As in Curtis, the Plaintiff was entitled

to recover its fee for its services.
POINT III.
THE DEFENDANTS MUST HAKE A REASONABLE EFFORT TO COMPLETE
THE TRANSACTION WITH THE INSURANCE COMPANY. IF THIS
EFFORT IS NOT MADE, THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
ITS FEE FOR ITS SERVICES.
In Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, 261 P2d 927 (Utah 1053), the
plaintiffs entered into a brokerage agreement whereby the defendant
broker was to receive a commission for its services.

The commission
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agreement provided that the commission was payable if the sale
was consummated.

An "earnest money agreement" was entered into,

the terms and conditions of which were subject to adjustment
agreeable to both parties.
conditions.

The parties did not agree on two

The parties rescinded the agreement and sued the

real estate broker to recover their advance fee.

The broker

counterclaimed to recover the remainder of the fee due based
on the commission which would have been required had a sale been
consummated.

The court found the brokers were entitled to recover

their commission notwithstanding that a transaction had not been
consummated.

The court stated:

.under such circumstances Hoyt could not, by
refusal to cooperate, defeat the defendant's right
to its commission. And we say this advisedly, notwithstanding the finding of the trial court, that
when Hoyt originally engaged the defendat to sell
the property, it was agreed that the commission
would be paid .only if the sale were consummated.
That agreement certainly contemplated that the
plaintiff would cooperate in good faith toward the
accomplishment of the purpose for which he employed
defendant. He cannot be permitted to Procure them
to obtain a buyer, on terms accepted by the plaintiff, and then prevent the accomplishment of what
he requested and authorized them to do by arbitrarily refusing to perform his nart of the transaction. Under such circumstances, he will not be
heard to complain of their failure to do that which
he prevented~
261 P2d at 930.
In Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P2d 857 (Utah 1979), the plaintiff
and the defendant had entered into an oral contract of ourchase
regarding certain real property. The defendant was to oay the
plaintiff a certain amount plus a fair commission.

The plaintiff
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refused to cooperate in discussing the commission issue.

This

court, in finding the contract enforceable, stated:
.but to be considered therewith is the further
proposition that the parties to a contract are
obliged to nroceed in good faith to coonerate in
performing the contract in accordance with its
exnressed intent.
Quite beyond this, one
party to a contract cannot bv willful act or omission
make it impossible or difficult for the other to
perform and then invoke the other's nonperformance
as a defense. 595 PZd at 859.
In the present situation, the defendants are in substantially the same position as the plaintiffs

in~

and Ferris.

Assuming arguendo, that the commitment of the Insurance Comnany
was not acceptable to the defendants, this non-acceutabilitv
results from the defendants' failure to comply with the apnraisal
condition of the Authorization to Obtain Financing.

If other

portions of the commitment were unclear to the defendants, the
defendants failed to take any stens to clarify the commitment or
to determine precisely what a loan commitnent for a commercial
real estate project consisted of.

The defendants engaged the

plaintiff to obtain a lender for them.

They cannot avoid their

obligation to the plaintiff by arbitratily refusing to coonerate
of by making it difficult or impossible for the nlaintiff to perforn.
POINT IV.
THE COMMITMENT SECURED BY THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE DEFENDANTS
WAS "ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES." "ACCEPTABLE" IS DEFI>IED
BY THE USUAL BUSINESS MEANING OF THE WORD AS APPLIED TO
THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS DEALINGS.
In Commercial Credit Companv v. Insular Motor Cornoration,
17 F2d 896 (1st Cir 1927), the plaintiff entered into an agreement
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with the defendant wherebv the nlaintiff agreed to nurchase ''acceptable retail time-sales obligations".

The defendant argued that the

contract lacked mutuality because a subjective internretation of the
term "acceptable" aoplied.

The court rejected this argument,

stating:
Plaintiff's agreement to purchase acceotable timesales obligations of the customers of the contract
dealers is to be given its normal business meaning,
bearing in mind that the olaintiff would have a ·
natural business motive to find all such obligations acceptable, if reasonably sound and fit to
be handled by such a financing concern.
'Accentable' does not mean accentable bv whim; it means
acceotable within the usual business meaning of
the word as aoolied to this kind of business
dealings. Failure or arbitrary refusal by the
pla1nt1ff to furnish the banking credit reasonably
contemnlated bv the contract would nlainlv have
been a.breach of a legal dutv, grounding
valid
claim for damages by anv dealer this injured.
(Emohasis added.) 17 F2d 899-900.

a

A loan commitment is a commonly utilized agreement in
the real estate financing.

A loan commitment contains certain

terms based on the project, the financial considerations, and the
nature of the loan transaction.
Osborne, Nelson and Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law,
West Publishing Co.

(1979) explains what a loan commitment as

utilized in real estate financing is as follows:
The permanent loan commitment, a promise by a
lender to make a long-term loan on the nroperty
when construction is completed, is of critical
importance . . . as a result of regulatory requirements, internal policies, or both, the great majority
of construction lenders will not issue their commitment until a permanent or 'take out' loan commitment has been first obtained.
The oermanent loan commitment will usually be
based on the same underwriting considerations as
the construction line loan: the borrower's credit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the project's design and technical feasibilitv,
an appraisal of its cornoleted value and marketability, and the satisfaction of various title
and other legal requirements.
Loan commitments are usually hedged with numerous
conditions to orotect the lender's interests.
Other common conditions include submission to
the lender of final plans and snecifications (if
the commitment is issued on the basis of preliminary versions or if the lender has required
changes) and submission of other documentation,
including the executed construction contract, the
documents creating the develoner entity (if a
corporation, partnership or trust), leases executed
by the major tenants, the title insurance report
and binder, the nermanent loan commitment if a
construction loan is being made, the building
permit, and nerhaps an oninion of counsel resnecting the vali~itv of the ~evelopers entity's
creation, its power to undertake the oroject, and
validity of the other documents.
In a permanent loan commitment on a nroject to
be built, lien-free completion in ac~ordance with
the agreed plans and soecifications will be made
a condition.
The permanent commitment on a rental nroject, such
as an apartment building or office building, may
also be conditioned upon some snecified fraction
of the nroject being rented. M~re complex
arrangements are sometimes used, so that a nartion
of the permanent loan will be funded at a given
rental level ('floor'), and the remainder on a
higher rental level ('ceiling') has been achieved.
Real Estate Finance Law, Section 12.3, on. 721-723.
The usual business meaning for a loan commitment for
commercial real estate financing includes the terms exnlained above
which were the terms of the Insurance Comnany's commitment.

The

Authorization to Obtain Financing obligated the nlaintiff to
deliver such a loan commitment.

The commitment delivered was

precisely that required by the contract.

Therefore, the nlaintiff
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met its obligations under the contract.

The plaintiff delivered a

loan commitment which was accentable to the parties.
POINT V.
WHE:J PERFORHA>JCE OF A CONTRACT INVOLVES SATISFACTION
OF ONE PARTY, AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF SATISFACTION
APPLIES.
In Haymore v. Levinson, 8 Utah2d 66, 328 P2d 307 (1958), the
plaintiff-contractor constructed a house for the defendants pursuant
to a contract which required "satisfactory completion."

The defendants

asserted that they were not satisfied with the construction and
that certain items on a list had not been completed.

The court

distinguished the cases where the undertaking is to do something
pleasing to the personal taste, fancy or sensibility of the other
party from a second classification of cases where operative fitness, etc. is involved.

An objective standard is aonlied to this

second classification of cases.

This court stated:

The other classifications involve satisfaction as
to such things as operative fitness, mechanical
utility or structural comnleteness in which the
personal sensibilities ju~t mentioned would not
reasonably be deemed of such predominant importance to the nerformance. As to such contracts,
rhe better c~nsidered view, and the one we adhere
to, is that an objective standard should be
applied: that is, that the narty favored by such
a provision has no arbitrarv nrivilege of
declining to acknowledge satisfaction and that he
cannot withhold aoproval unless there is apparent
some reasonable justification for doing so.
328 PZd at 309.
In W. P. Harland Construction Comoanv v. Utah State Road
Commission, 19 Utal12d 364, 431 P2d 972 (1967), the plaintiff claimed
that the defendant had refused to anprove the use of certain

-13-
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equipment in a highway construction nroject.

There was no conten-

tion that the defendant had agreed to the use of the equinment,
but rather that the defendant had refused to allow its use without
reason or justification.

The court stated the obligation of the

defendant as follows:
.However, it is to be conceded that where a
contract orovides that a matter of acoroval or
satisfaction of a method of oneration, or nerformance of a contract, is reserved to a carty,
it is to be assumed that he will act fairly and
in good faith.
It is generally held the he cannot without any reason or excuse, arbitrarily
withhold aooroval, or acknowledgement of satisfaction.
431 P2d at 793.
In Harland, because the defendant's structural engineer
had given considerable attention and consideration to the nronosed
equipment, was familiar with other tests of the equioment and had
personally observed the ooeration of alternative equinment, the
court found the defendqnt had not acted arbitrarilv.

However, in

the present case, the defendants determined that there were several
terms of the loan commitment which were nersonally unaccentable
to them.

The defendant had not and did not contact anv financial

institutions or legal counsel (excent for Mr. Jensen, who is an
attorney) with regard to the loan commitment (as required bv

~

They took no steps to determine whether the loan commitment was
objectively satisfactory and accentable.
POINT VI.
THE DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF TO
CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS OR SEEK OTHER FINANCING WAS
A REPUDIATION TO OBTAIN FINANCING.
Assuming arguendo, that the commitment secured for the
defendants was not accentable to the carties, that the comnletion of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the anpraisal was not the defendants' obligation under the
Authorization to Obtain Financing, and that the defendants did not
arbitrarily refuse to enter into the agreement, the defendants
still had an obligation to allow the plaintiff to continue to
perform its obligations under the Authorization to Obtain Financing.

The Authorization to Obtain Financing was not effectively

cancelled until apnroximately March 1, 1979.

This cancellation

came by reason of the letter of the defendants' legal counsel,
who recognized that the contract remained in force until that
date.
On or about February 7, 1979, the defendants refused to
provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to continue negotiations
with the Insurance Companv or other prosnective lenders.

They

further refused to disclose the concerns they had for the loan
commitment.

The plaintiff remained willing until ~he defendants

refused to continue to assist the defendants with their search
for financing.
In C.R.I. v. Watson, 608 FZd 1137 (8th Circuit 1979),
the owner of a shopping center entered into an agreement whereby
the plaintiff had the exclusive right to find a corporate
buyer of a portion of the shonning center.

The agreement was

subject to certain other agreements being delivered to and
accepted by the defendant.
The defendant notified the plaintiff he wasn't going to
go through with the contract.

This renudiation made the plaintiff's
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performance impossible eMen though the nlaintiff remained readv,
In finding the broker entitled to

able and willing to nerform.

recover the commission which it would have received had it oroduced a buyer, the court stated:
Watson, (defendant) also challenged the court's
finding that, 'bv refusing to nerform in accordance with the terms of the Sentember 18 contract,
Watson made it imnossible for C.R.I. to nroduce
a buyer as required. C.R.I., at all times, stood
ready, willing and able to nroduce a buver, but
was prevented from doing so only by Watson's repudiation of the agreement.' Watson's actual arguments do not refute the finding that there was
'reasonable likelihood of (C.R.I. 's)(nlaintiff's)
ability to produce a buyer,' or that 0atson's breach
prevented C.R.I. from performing.
The court not only found C.R.I. had made substantial efforts and
had unto at least two notential nurchasers, but also that C.R.I.
was prepared to purchase.
In C.R.I.,

608 FZd at

114~.

the broker was allowed to recover its commiss

when a repudiation took place before the broker had oerformed or
found any potential buyers.

In the present case, the nlaintiff

had already found at least one ootential lender nrior to the
repudiation of the defendants.
entitled to recover its fee.

Therefore, the nlaintiff is
The defendants cannot avoid their

contractual duties by repudiating the agreement.
CONCLUSION
The nlaintiff was entitled to recover a fee for its
services in negotiating financing for the defendants.

The olaintif

became en ti tied to this fee upon de Ii verv of a loan commitment.
plaintiff delivered a tentative and final loan commitment.
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The

Thi

final loan commitment, on an objective basis, was nrecisely
the commitment contemplated by the narties' contract and was
acceptable to the oarties.
The defendants cannot avoid their obligation to comPensate the plaintiff for its services by failing to have an appraisal
completed, by refusing to coonerate or making Performance difficult
or impossible, by failing to agree among themselves, or by
repudiating the agreement.

The defendants should be required to

compensate the plaintiff.
The plaintiff resnectfully submits that the District
Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's Comnlaint should be reversed,
and judgment for the Plaintiff in the amount of $12,000.00 should
be entered.

Should the olaintiff not be found entitled to a

reversal, the Plaintiff submits that the judgment on the defendants' Counterclaim should be reversed.

In the alternative, the

plaintiff submits that a new trial should be granted.
DATED this

:3J

-~---

day of August, 1981.

HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON
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& DUNN
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